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WHAT IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS REMOVED AND
UNREMOVED INDIAN NATIONS?
Ann C. Juliano*
The question of removed and unremoved Indian nations competing
with each other arises here in New York in the context of the land
claims. There is also a land claim which has been filed in Pennsylvania.
There are no federally recognized tribes in Pennsylvania and thus, there
is an issue of a removed tribe returning to exercise jurisdiction. This
raises the next question: what kind of jurisdiction do returning removed
tribes have, and, given that removal policy across the country, can these
types of cases arise in any number of states?
When considering the federal government's trust responsibility,
one must consider the unique context of the federal government. It has
many obligations imposed by statutes and then it has the trust
responsibility, which does not spring out of a statute. As I have argued
before, the federal government has an inherent conflict when it comes to
the trust responsibility because the same government officials are
making litigation decisions in actions to benefit tribes and in actions
brought by tribes against the govequnent. 1 These officials have to
decide what positions to take in litigation and, ultimately, the same
people are making those decisions for and against Indian interests. So, I
usually think of a conflict in the trust responsibility as a conflict
between Indian interests and non-Indian interests. The question here is
particularly interesting because it is a question of competing tribal
interests. Therefore, determining the government's trust responsibility
towards removed and unremoved nations, in some instances, is really a
question of determining how the trust responsibility should apply when
there are competing tribal interests.
I will not address the questions raised by many here of how the
federal government should be involved in the land claim litigation, what
they should do in the negotiations, or what they should do in the
settlement, other than to say I think it is proper that the federal
government either intervene in the ongoing claims to support the tribes
or bring claims to support the tribes when there have been illegal
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transactions in the past.
There are two questions to consider in the area of competing tribal
interests. First, should the federal government seek to acquire lands, the
return of lands for removed nations and/or support tribal jurisdiction
over such returned lands? Second, in reaching this decision, should the
federal government consider the interests of non-Indians or the interests
of the unremoved nations?
To answer those questions, you must start with what are the
purposes of trust responsibility, and how should we define the trust
responsibility?
There are two ways to view the trust responsibility: affirmatively
or negatively. In the affirmative view, when we begin a decisionmaking process, we ask: What must the federal government do, in this
particular situation, to fulfill its trust responsibility? How do we define
the obligations upon the federal government?
The negative or defensive way to think about the trust
responsibility is: if the government takes this action, or after it has
acted, is it liable for breach of trust? Note that I am pretending that the
second question does not drive the first question. That is, the
government does not take action based solely on whether or not it will
be liable for breach of trust. The affirmative method of contemplating
the trust responsibility is a more powerful tool for tribal advocates
because some Supreme Court cases, which I will discuss later, limit
breach of trust actions.
The history and development of the trust responsibility has been
reviewed earlier today. Let me reiterate a few simple points. It is
generally accepted that the trust responsibility arose from the Cherokee
Trilogy cases. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice Marshall created
the guardian-ward relationship. 2 This relationship imposes some
obligations on the federal government because the government serves as
a guardian. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall held that tribes
possessed sovereign rights which freed them from state control. In
addition, he referred to Indian Nations as taking protection from the
federal government. 3 The positive view is that the government owes
protection to Indian Nations and thus, has some obligations to Indian
Nations. The judicial and the executive branches have spent the last 170
years trying to give meaning to these obligations.
With one notable exception, the courts have become increasingly

2. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
3. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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willing to apply private trust principles to the federal government's
relationship with Indian nations. In a recent Supreme Court case, White
Mountain Apache, Justice Souter held that elementary trust law
confirms the common sense assumption that a fiduciary, who actually
administers trust property, may not allow it to fall into ruin on his
watch. 4 It seems pretty clear. If you are administering a trust as a
trustee and dealing with trust property, you have a duty "to preserve and
maintain trust assets." The Court reached this conclusion even though
the statutes at issue that created this duty on the government did not
expressly subject the government to duties of management and
conservation. The statute did not explicitly require the government to
conserve the assets. The fact that the property was occupied by the
United States, as trustee, was enough to obligate the government to
preserve property improvements. Thus, the United States has an
obligation to preserve and maintain tribal assets, including land and
natural resources.
I would argue that the more fundamental trust asset that the United
States has is a duty to protect tribal sovereignty and tribal jurisdiction.
Others have reached the same conclusion. One argued that, under the
Cherokee cases, the chief objective of the trust responsibility is to
protect tribal status as self-governing entities. 5
Therefore, as trustee, the federal government should seek to protect
the tribes from encroachment by States, should vigorously defend tribes
against the exercise of state authority in Indian country, and, of course,
should seek to enforce the law. In doing so, the federal government
should seek to establish and protect tribal sovereignty and do so in a
way to best protect tribal sovereignty. This is where the City of Sherrill
case comes in. 6
In the City of Sherrill case, the Second Circuit Court affirmed the
lower court's decision that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York's
purchase of fee-land within its historic reservation, recognized by the
1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, is exempt from state and municipal taxes.
Taxation turns on the question of whether or not the properties are in
Indian country. Under well-established case law, reservation land is
Indian country. It is land set aside by the federal government for Indian
use thereby meeting the definition of Indian country. The purchase of
the land even in the absence of the United States taking the land into

4. See U.S. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
5. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
6. See Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139 (2003).
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trust, re-establishes the property as reservation land. Because the federal
government never ended the reservation status of the land, the land
remains as Indian country. The Second Circuit rejected an argument
that the land has to be taken into trust for it to be tax-exempt. Further,
the Second Circuit rejected arguments that the reservation had been
disestablished because the Court found there was no clear
Congressional intent to disestablish.
This case provides the federal government with a means to
establish an expanding tribal jurisdiction base, without having to take
land into trust. Of course, other Indian nations, which are signatories to
the 1794 Treaty, may face different results because of the differing
treaty language, different evidence, and the possibility of Congressional
intent to disestablish.
Now, at this point, I have not discussed the interests of nonbeneficiaries to the trust relationship.
Under private trust law
principles, the interests of non-beneficiaries should not come into play
in the government's decision-making in reference to Indian Nations. In
representing a beneficiary, the government should be thinking solely of
the best interests of the beneficiary.
This leads me to the negative or defensive use of the trust
responsibility. If the United States takes a particular position or a
particular action, when does that decision amount to a violation of the
trust responsibility such that would require the payment of money
damages? In a pair of cases, the Supreme Court held that in order to
receive money damages, there has to be a substantive right that can be
interpreted as giving rise to a claim for money damages. 7 There must be
a comprehensive statutory scheme or the assumption of elaborate
control by the government over the property of Indians.
There is no statutory scheme dealing with competing tribal
interests. In fact, the land into trust provisions that I am going to talk
about in a minute, simply require the consideration of certain factors.
The statutes do not say anything about what decision you should reach.
There is nothing specific in statute or regulations that would allow a
tribe to sue for any particular decision the United States makes with
regard to competing tribal interests, in terms of money damages. You
could get equitable relief, but not money damages.
The Supreme Court discussed breach of trust and the concept of
competing interests in the Nevada case. 8 The Court said that the
7. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell/); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell//).
8. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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government may fulfill its obligation to represent Indian tribes in
litigation even if Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as
well. This case involved water rights where, because the United States
was representing other statutorily-imposed interests, it did not ask for as
much water for the tribe as it should have. The tribe sought to re-open
that decree years later and the Supreme Court said that Congress told
the Department of the Interior that it must represent Indian and nonIndian interests. Thus, there is no disabling conflict. The Justice
Department has interpreted this holding to mean that there is never a
conflict when you deal with competing interests. That is sort of a
mantra the Justice Department has. In Nevada, there is no conflict. I
have lots to say on Nevada and the government's use of Nevada, but
that is for another time.
Lower courts have held that Nevada holds merely that the duty of
undivided loyalty that the private trustee has does not apply to the
United States because it simply cannot. The federal government has too
many responsibilities to apply these particular private trust principles.
If you combine Mitchell and Nevada, consideration of non-Indian
interests or consideration of competing tribal interests does not amount
to a breach of the trust responsibility. The negative concept of the trust
responsibility does not provide any aid in determining what the
government's response should be to competing tribal interests.
Let us then return to the affirmative concept of the trust
responsibility. If the affirmative obligation of the trust responsibility is
to protect tribal assets and to expand and protect tribal jurisdiction, the
United States should pro-actively take land into trusts. By taking land
into trust, the federal government will help tribes avoid the fight of
whether or not land is Indian country. The main provision for taking
land into trust is 25 U.S.C. §465, wherein the Secretary of Interior is
authorized to exercise her discretion to acquire any interest in lands for
the purpose of providing lands for Indians. Under the statute and
implementing regulations, title is taken in the name of the United States
in trust for the tribe. The land is exempt from State and local taxation.
The land may be acquired for a tribe in trust status when it is located
within the exterior boundaries of the tribe's reservation, within the
reservation or adjacent thereto, when the tribe already owns an interest
in the land, and when the Secretary determines that the acquisition is
necessary for tribal self-determination, economic development, or
Indian housing. 9 An important factor, then, is if the property is located

9. 25 C.F.R. Pt. 151.
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within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation. This factor requires a
definition of "reservation." The City of Sherrill case tells us that any
land within a non-disestablished reservation should be considered a
reservation. The regulations say an Indian Reservation is any area of
land over which the tribe is recognized by the United States as having
jurisdiction. It is, to say the least, a circular argument.
When the land is within a reservation, the Secretary has to consider
numerous factors. The important one for our discussion is: if you are
acquiring land that is in fee status, you have to consider the impact on
the State and the municipalities resulting from the removal of the land
from the tax rolls. 10 Then, you have to contemplate the jurisdictional
problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise. II Thus,
these factors take into account interests of non-Indian and possibly
interests of competing tribes.
If the land to be acquired is off reservation, the Secretary has to
consider the same criteria plus the location of the land relative to State
boundaries and its distance from the tribe's reservation. I2 The greater
the distance from the tribe's reservation the land is the greater scrutiny
the Secretary shall give to the tribe's justification of anticipated
benefits.
Further, the Secretary has to notify State and local
governments and give them comment time of the potential impact on
jurisdiction, taxes, and special assessments. I3 Thus, there are different
considerations if the land is off reservation.
To summarize then, under the statute and these regulations, the
Secretary has to consider jurisdictional problems, tax issues, and has to
treat reservation land differently from off reservation land.
A second method to acquire land in trust is under the Indian
Gaming Regulations Act (IGRA). IGRA prohibits tribes from gaming
on lands acquired by the Secretary after October 17th, 1988, unless the
lands are within or contiguous to a reservation (again raising the
question of what counts as a reservation) or the tribe can show that the
gaming establishment would be in the best interests of the tribe and its
members and not detrimental to the surrounding community.I 4 In
addition, the Secretary must consult with local officials, including
officials of nearby tribes, and the governor of the state has to concur. Is

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

25
25
25
25
25
25

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 151.IO(e).
§ 151.IO(f).
§ 151.1 l(b).
§ 151.1 l(d).
§ 2719(b)(l)(A).
§ 2719(b)(l)(A).
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In other words, the Secretary has to consider non-Indian and competing
tribal interests but the statute does not say what the result should be.
The Secretary has to consult these parties but the statute does not say
what happens if they all oppose it. This is simply a question of
administrative procedure. If you can prove the Secretary did not consult
these parties, then you can prove the Secretary violated procedure.
However, it does not help with our initial question of how the United
States is supposed to make its decision of what to do under the trust
responsibility.
Case law that deals with competing tribal interests almost always
arises in the context of intervention or in the context of indispensable
parties. Is there someone who really has to be in this lawsuit? If they
are not in this lawsuit, can we still go forward with this lawsuit? As a
result, we have cases where the United States is suing or is being sued
over action taken with respect to a particular tribe. In essence, the
federal government does something with respect to a particular tribe,
and another tribe seeks to intervene or argues that an absent tribe is
indispensable, but cannot be joined because of their sovereign
immunity.
In these cases, the courts have held that where there are several
tribes involved, the United States ~annot adequately represent the absent
tribes. One example is a fish management plan that covers a whole
bunch of treaty tribes and a challenge to the management plan by one
tribe. 16 Also, there are 23 other absent tribes who are not involved in the
lawsuit. The court held that the government could not represent the
interests of the absent tribes because the interests all conflict among
themselves. The government cannot represent the interests of those
absent tribes; therefore, the court dismissed the whole lawsuit.
In another case, there was a plan for a distribution of funds from
land that had been held for three different tribes. 17 The three tribes sued
in various permutations over different claims. The court said the
government could not represent all tribes and that whatever the
allegiance the government owes to the tribes as trustee is necessarily
split among the three competing tribes.
Perhaps most on point is in a gaming case, in which the Wyandotte
Tribe asked for land to be taken into trust, the Secretary approved it, and
other tribes sued to stop the land from being taken into trust. 18 Since the
16. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
17. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
18. Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
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Wynadottes were not in the case, the Appellate Court addressed whether
they had to be brought into the case and, since they cannot be brought
into the case because they have sovereign immunity, whether the case
should be dismissed. The court said their ability to conduct gaming on
their land will only survive if all of the Secretary's determinations are
upheld. The Secretary's interest in defending his determinations is
virtually identical to the tribe's interest, and therefore, the case may
proceed. Even though the tribes who brought the case and the
Wyandottes are in conflict, the Secretary can still go forward and
represent the Wyandottes.
These cases tell us that the United States cannot represent
competing tribes when there is a conflict between tribes and then we
allow tribes to intervene to represent their own interests. But again, how
to formulate a decision to interfere in the first place remains unclear.
So, what are the options for the United States in trying to formulate
a decision in the first place? First, I think that the United States should
not take sides between tribes, but sometimes it has to. When one tribe
asks for an action and another tribe opposes the action, the United States
has to make a decision.
If we reconfigure the situation and say that a tribe asks for some
action and a non-Indian interest opposes it, how much weight should the
non-Indian interest have under private trust principles? None. Nontribal interests should have no weight in the consideration of what the
trustee should do for its beneficiary. It should only determine what is in
the best interests of the beneficiary without contemplating other
interests, unless required to do so under those regulations I mentioned.
Sometimes the federal government is required to consider other
interests. If it is not required to do so, it should not.
You could take the same approach to competing tribal interests.
The United States should only contemplate the interest of the tribe
requesting the action to the exclusion of other tribal interests. However,
the United States has a trust responsibility to all tribes. It really should
contemplate what is in the best interests of all tribes. The question then
is: as we contemplate all tribes, is there any principled way to order the
obligations between removed and unremoved tribes?
You could argue that the United States has made its priorities clear
through treaties. Some tribes were allowed to stay, some tribes were
not. The obligation is to protect the rights granted under the treaties.
However, you could also argue that the U.S. is responsible for removing
tribes and, therefore, should support a return to indigenous lands.
Further, it is wrong to suggest that tribes should not act to protect
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their own self interests by opposing operations which would impact
them economically. To do so would require, through some sense of
racial solidarity, a subjugation of interests that we do not require from
other sovereigns. We do not expect New York to consider what is in
the best interest of Connecticut before it does anything. So why should
we expect tribes to adopt that approach?
At bottom, the United States should not decide between competing
interests based on a tribe's economic advantage. This is not an
appropriate use of the trust responsibility. The United States should
consider what is in the best interests of the tribe at issue. To the extent
other tribes object, then the United States should consider the effect on
the objecting tribes' sovereignty and jurisdiction, with an eye towards,
at all times, expanding, improving and strengthening tribal jurisdiction
and sovereignty. The loss of economic advantage should not play a
deciding role.
Within a specific context of the New York land claims, the U.S.
has backed away from the position of seeking ejectment of individual
landowners. District court judges are not allowing ejectment as a
remedy against landowners and they will not allow the addition of
individual landowners. 19 Money damages are the replacement remedy,
which we have heard from some speakers here today is not an
acceptable remedy. But purchasing land in the claim area is exactly
what Judge McCum envisioned when he awarded money damages. In
the Cayuga case, the Court held:
As the Court envisions it, eventually, the Cayugas will have the
financial means to purchase land within the claim area from willing
sellers. When that is done, the Cayugas will, once again, have a
homeland where their culture can thrive and they can reach their
objectives such as economic, political and cultural development,
which can be reached without ejecting thousands upon thousands of
landowners. 20

The U.S. should support the use of money damages by claimant
tribes, including supporting removed tribes by purchasing land in the
claim area. Such support will encourage the establishment of Indian
country and encourage tribal jurisdiction.
In the case known as the Moe Lake case: "This case pits one group
of Indian tribes, who hope to open a new gambling facility, against

19. See e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D.
61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
20. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuoma, 1999 WL 509442 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
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another tribe that currently runs another gambling facility nearby."21
Two tribes formed a partnership with a non-tribal entity to acquire a
struggling greyhound track and asked Interior to take the property into
trust. Another tribe had a reservation nearby and opposed the racetrack.
That tribe predicted that the proposed casino would have a detrimental
impact on the gaming revenues it derived from its two casinos and the
loss of revenue would harm the quality of life on the reservation.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) area office decided that IGRA
§2719 had been met, so the government could take the land into trust.
At this point, federal elected officials and the other tribes got involved.
They expressed concern about the effect of the new casino and met with
higher ranking BIA officials. Interior then told the partnership that it
failed to demonstrate that the new casino would not have a detrimental
impact on the surrounding community. The partnership filed suit. This
case led to a special prosecutor and an investigation of various
employees at Interior. There was a settlement agreement, under which
Interior withdrew the opinion. Interior agreed to restart the
administrative review and explicitly rejected reliance on the competition
by the proposed casino and casinos of other tribes as determinative
factor.
I argue that Interior should never have asked, in determining if this
particular statute was met, whether some other tribe's casino is going to
suffer economically. I do not mean to suggest that an economic loss of
advantage does not affect sovereignty and jurisdiction in the ability to
help people on the reservation, but that is not an appropriate
consideration for the United States.
A second example: The new Ho-Chunk Nation Compact with
Wisconsin requires the state not to concur with any positive
determination made by the Secretary of Interior that an application
meets IGRA when the Ho-Chunks have notified the State that the
operation of the proposed establishment will cause a substantial
reduction of their gaming revenues at any of the Ho-Chunk Nation's
gaming facilities. Unless the tribe that wants to open up the new facility
has entered into a binding indemnification agreement with the HoChunk Nation to compensate it for loss of revenue, the Ho-Chunk
Nation is relieved of its obligations to make payments to the State if the
State concurs without this indemnification agreement.
Two tribes filed suit against Interior based on this Compact,
arguing it is unlawful to allow one tribe to interfere with another tribe's

21. See Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2000).
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efforts by giving the right to be free from economic competition. These
two tribes are seeking off-reservation casinos and the United States
either affirmatively approved this Compact or let it go into effect
without action. Again, I do not think this is appropriate. It is picking
between competing tribes and doing it based on economic advantage.
The Senecas have the same kind of non-compete exclusive rights
to gamble within a 25-mile radius in their Compact. There is an
exception for two non-compacting tribes. The State may negotiate with
these tribes to establish a gaming facility. However, these two tribes
argue it is a violation of the trust obligation of the United States to
include provisions that explicitly restrict the economic opportunities
that are available to them. Secretary Norton allowed this to take effect
without secretarial action. In doing so, she agreed that by approving the
Compact, the Department would essentially ratify an agreement that has
the effect of restricting the economic opportunities of the Tonawanda
Band and Tuscarora Nation. She argued, however, it does not violate
trust obligations because the tribe has no legal right to off-reservation
gaming under IGRA. She notes that future compacts may pit tribe
against tribe. So, I think that these two Compacts violate the trust
responsibility, by which I do not mean that there is an ability to seek
money damages, but that the United States is inappropriately
considering the interests of a competing tribe.
The United States, in considering removed and unremoved nations'
interests, should contemplate what is best for the purpose of
strengthening and supporting tribal jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty. If
that means that the federal government has to ignore what is going to
happen to another tribe's casino, then so be it.
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